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Abstract 
Delusions and misperceptions about the body are a conspicuous feature of numerous 
neurological and psychiatric conditions. In stark contrast to such pathological cases, the 
immediacy and familiarity of our ordinary experience of our body can make it seem as if 
our representation of our body is highly accurate, even infallible. Recent research has 
begun to demonstrate, however, that large and systematic distortions of body 
representation are a normal part of healthy cognition. Here, I will describe this 
research, focusing on distortions of body representations underlying tactile distance 
perception and position sense. I will also discuss evidence for distortions of higher-
order body representations, such as the conscious body image. Finally, I will end with a 
discussion of the potential relations among different body representations and their 
distortions. 
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 Our body is the core of our sense of self, and central to our personal identity as 
an individual. We experience our body from the outside, as a physical object in the 
world like any other, but also from the inside, as an object of immediate experience 
(Bermúdez, Marcel, & Eilan, 1995). The intimate and direct connection we have with 
our own body can make knowledge of our body seem immune to the usual sources of 
perceptual error and illusion. Indeed, the very fact that we have multiple ways of 
knowing about our body (from inside, and from outside) could very well contribute to 
making the overall perception of the body highly reliable. While distortions and 
misperceptions of the body are a familiar result of several psychiatric and neurological 
conditions, it is natural to suppose that healthy adults have highly accurate – even 
infallible – knowledge about the physical structure of their bodies. In this paper, I will 
describe recent research that has begun to question this assumption, showing large and 
systematic distortions of body representation in healthy adults. After giving a brief 
summary of the varied distortions of body representation found in pathological 
conditions, I will describe research showing large distortions of body representations 
underlying somatosensory perception of tactile distance and position sense. Finally, I 
will discuss other results showing distortions underlying higher-level aspects of body 
representations and end with a discussion of the relationships among the various 
distortions I discuss. 
 
Distorted body representations in disease 
 The various distortions and misperceptions of body representation found in 
disease have long attracted widespread interest, both among researchers and the wider 
public. In large part, this interest is due to their sheer strangeness, and the striking 
contrast they present to the seeming immediacy of our normal experience of our body. 
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Within neurology, perhaps the most widely investigated misperception is the case of 
phantom limbs, in which an amputated limb is perceived by the patient as continuing to 
exist (Melzack, 1992; Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998). Phantoms occur in a substantial 
majority of cases of amputation (Melzack, 1992), and less frequently following 
congenital limb absence (Brugger et al., 2000). The subjectively felt presence of the 
missing limb can be so strong that the patient may even try to walk with a phantom leg 
(Melzack, 1990). Another curious condition occurs following damage to the right 
hemisphere, in which patients with impaired motor control over their left arm 
frequently deny any such problem, a delusion known as anosognosia for hemiplegia 
(Berti et al., 2005; Fotopoulou et al., 2008). In other cases, patients with motor loss may 
deny that the paralyzed limb is actually theirs, insisting that it belongs to, for example, a 
family member, a condition called somatoparaphrenia (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). 
Sometimes, patients with damage to the right parietal lobe will simply deny that the left 
half of their body even exists (asomatagnosia; Critchley, 1953). In autoscopic illusions 
and out-of-body experiences, people experience a dramatic dissociation between the 
experienced location of the body and their first-person perspective (Brugger, Regard, & 
Landis, 1997; Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 2004). 
 Strange misperceptions of the body are also found in several psychiatric 
conditions. Patients with eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa, for example, will 
commonly insist that they are fat, even while completely emaciated (Bruch, 1978; 
Treasure, Claudino, & Zucker, 2010). Such body image distortions are a strong predictor 
of negative prognosis (Casper, Halmi, Goldberg, Eckert, & Davis, 1979) and of relapse 
following recovery (Fairburn, Peveler, Jones, Hope, & Doll, 1993; Keel, Dorer, Franko, 
Jackson, & Herzog, 2005). Patients with body dysmorphic disorder are fixated on the idea 
that some specific part of their body is hideously ugly, though it appears normal to 
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everyone else (Phillips, Didie, Feusner, & Wilhelm, 2008). Finally, in the case of body 
integrity identity disorder (sometimes called xenomelia), individuals with apparently 
intact bodies insist that they would feel more complete with some specific part of their 
body removed (Brugger, Lenggenhager, & Giummarra, 2013; First, 2005). This 
represents a curious inversion of the case of phantom limbs, a sort of ‘negative’ 
phantom. 
 Such a list of conditions makes striking reading, in large part because of the 
difficulty in identifying with such seemingly bizarre delusions. For most of us, our 
ordinary experience of our body doesn’t feel anything like such cases, making them 
seem far removed from body representation in healthy adults. Nevertheless, an 
emerging body of research has begun to show that distortions of body representations 
are a normal part of ordinary, healthy cognitive life. It may be that these distortions 
reflect weak forms of the sorts of distortions seen in various diseases. Alternately, these 
distortions in healthy people might reflect entirely different mechanisms. In the 
following sections, I will discuss this research. 
 
Distortions in tactile size perception 
 Distortions in perceived tactile size or distance have been known since the 
classic investigations of Ernst Weber in the 19th century (Weber, 1834/1996). Weber 
noticed that as he moved the two points of a compass across his skin, it felt as if the 
distance between the points changed. Specifically, perceived distance was greater on 
regions of relatively high tactile sensitivity (like the palm of the hand) compared to less 
sensitive regions (such as the forearm). Subsequent research has confirmed Weber’s 
observations and shown a systematic relation between the spatial sensitivity of skin 
surfaces and the perceived distance between two touches (e.g., Anema, Wolswijk, Ruis, 
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& Dijkerman, 2008; Cholewiak, 1999; Taylor-Clarke, Jacobsen, & Haggard, 2004), an 
effect now referred to as Weber’s Illusion. 
 One natural way to think about Weber’s illusion is as a vestigial remnant of the 
well-known distortion of primary somatosensory maps, which show dramatically 
disproportionate representation of sensitive skin regions (i.e., cortical magnification), as 
famously depicted in textbook illustrations of the “Penfield homunculus” (Penfield & 
Boldrey, 1937), with gigantic lips, fingers, and genitals. It is obviously adaptive to have 
exquisite tactile sensitivity on specific skin surfaces, such as the fingertips, which allows 
us to perform dexterous behaviors that would be impossible were we to have 
homogenously mediocre sensitive across the skin surface. Weber’s illusion shows that 
such homuncular distortions bias higher-level aspects of tactile perception, which may 
be a small price to pay for the benefits of specialization. Nevertheless, as Taylor-Clarke 
and colleagues (2004) noted, the magnitude of Weber’s illusion is substantially less than 
would be predicted if perceived tactile distance was directly proportional to cortical 
magnification, suggesting the operation of some form of tactile size constancy. They 
estimated that the illusion was about 10% of what would be expected based on 
magnification. In my opinion, even this may overstate the effect. Sur, Merzenich, and 
Kaas (1980) found differences as big as two orders of magnitude between the 
magnification levels on different skin regions of owl monkeys. It is unlikely that any 
perceptual effect in humans would be more than 1-2% of that. 
 A number of studies have demonstrated tight links between tactile distance 
perception and higher-order aspects of body representation. For example, Taylor-
Clarke and colleagues (2004) found that magnification or minification of the visual 
experience of body parts produced systematic alterations of perceived tactile distances 
subsequently applied. Similarly, de Vignemont, Ehrsson, and Haggard (2005) created an 
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illusion of finger elongation using a vibration-induced proprioceptive illusion, showing 
that this produced a corresponding lengthening of perceived tactile distance. Tajadura-
Jiménez and colleagues (2012) used audio-motor cues to create the experience of one’s 
arm being longer than its actual size. Such an illusion of elongation produced a 
corresponding increase in perceived tactile distances on the arm. In another study, 
Longo and Sadibolova (2013) found that simply looking at the stimulated hand 
produced a reduction in perceived tactile distances, compared to looking at a non-body 
object. This effect parallels other known effects of vision of the body on somatosensory 
processing, such as enhancing tactile spatial acuity (Cardini, Longo, & Haggard, 2011; 
Kennett, Taylor-Clarke, & Haggard, 2001) and reducing acute pain (Longo, Betti, Aglioti, 
& Haggard, 2009; Mancini, Longo, Kammers, & Haggard, 2011). Other recent research 
has shown that perceived tactile distance is expanded across joint boundaries, showing 
that the high-level segmentation of the body into discrete parts produces categorical 
perception effects on tactile distance (de Vignemont, Majid, Jola, & Haggard, 2009; Le 
Cornu Knight, Longo, & Bremner, 2014). Finally, two recent studies have shown that 
tool-use, which can be thought of as extending arm size, also produces systematic 
changes to tactile distance perception (Canzoneri et al., 2013; Miller, Longo, & Saygin, 
2014). 
 In its classic form described to this point, Weber’s illusion reflects differences in 
the represented size of different skin regions. An analogous logic, however, can also be 
applied to stimuli presented at different orientations on a single skin surface to 
investigate the represented shape of an individual skin surface. Longo and Haggard 
(2011), for example, asked participants to make forced-choice judgments of the 
perceived size of tactile distances oriented in the medio-lateral axis of the hand dorsum 
(i.e., across the hand) versus the proximo-distal axis (i.e., along the hand). If the hand 
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were represented as longer and thinner than it actually is, stimuli oriented along the 
length of the hand should be perceived as bigger than identical stimuli running across 
the width of the hand; if, in contrast, the hand were represented as squat and fat, the 
opposite should be true. In fact, stimuli running across the width of the hand were 
perceived as approximately 40% larger than those running across the length of the 
hand, suggesting a squat and fat bias. This bias is reduced or even eliminated on the 
glabrous skin of the palm (Le Cornu Knight et al., 2014; Longo & Haggard, 2011; Longo, 
Ghosh, & Yahya, 2015a). Moreover, while there are clear correlations across people in 
the magnitude of such distortion on both the dorsal and palmar surfaces of the two 
hands, within each hand there is no correlation between the distortions on the two 
surfaces (Longo et al., 2015a). Such anisotropies are not limited to the hand, but have 
been found on other body parts, including the forearm (Green, 1982; Le Cornu Knight et 
al., 2014), the leg (Green, 1982), and the face (Longo et al., 2015a), suggesting that it 
may reflect a basic principle of body representation, rather than something 
idiosyncratic to the hands, or even to limbs. 
 Longo and Haggard (2011) proposed a ‘pixel’ model to account for such effects. 
The basic idea of the pixel model is that the receptive fields (RFs) of individual neurons 
in a somatotopic map are treated like pixels in a two-dimensional spatial array. 
Distances would then be calculated by essentially counting the number of pixels 
separating two stimulated locations. RFs of neurons representing sensitive skin 
surfaces are smaller than those representing less sensitive skin surfaces (e.g., Powell & 
Mountcastle, 1959; Sur et al., 1980). Because the spacing between RFs is known to be a 
constant ratio of RF size (Sur et al., 1980), a tactile distance applied to a sensitive 
surface (e.g., the hand) will have more unstimulated RFs between the two stimulated 
points than will an identical tactile distance applied to a less sensitive skin surface (e.g., 
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the forehead). This can account for Weber’s illusion, since the increased number of 
pixels crossed by a stimulus on a sensitive skin surface will lead it to be perceived as 
bigger than on a less sensitive surface.  
 
Figure 1: The ‘pixel’ model proposed by Longo and Haggard (2011). Distances on the body are 
represented in terms of the number of receptive fields (RFs) which a stimulus covers. RFs which 
vary in size and shape are interpreted as being equally sized and circular. Thus, is a given tactile 
distance is applied to two skin surfaces with differently-sized RFs (e.g., the forehead and palm), 
the distance applied to the surface with smaller RFs (the palm) will be perceived as bigger than 
that applied to the surface with larger RFs (the forehead), producing the standard form of 
Weber’s illusion. When RFs on a single skin surface are oval-shaped (such as on the hairy skin of 
the hand dorsum), a tactile distance oriented with the short axis of the RFs (i.e., across the width 
of the hand) will be perceived as bigger than the same distance oriented with the long axis of the 
RFs (i.e., along the length of the hand). 
  
Importantly, however, the pixel model can also account for the orientational 
version of Weber’s illusion described by Longo and Haggard (2011). RFs of SI neurons 
Distortions of Body Representations 
 10 
representing the hairy skin of the limbs are known to be oval-shaped, rather than 
circular, and with the long-axis of the RF running along the proximo-distal axis of the 
arm (e.g., Alloway, Rosenthal, & Burton, 1989; Brooks, Rudomin, & Slayman, 1961; 
Powell & Mountcastle, 1959). Because RFs are smaller in the medio-lateral axis of the 
limb, tactile distances applied across the width of the hand will have more unstimulated 
pixels than the same distance applied along the length of the hand, and should thus be 
perceived as bigger. On the glabrous skin of the palm, in contrast, RFs are both more 
circular and, when oval-shaped, do not tend to have a preferred orientation (e.g., 
DiCarlo & Johnson, 2002; DiCarlo, Johnson, & Hsiao, 1998). Thus, the pixel model can 
also account for anisotropies in tactile distance perception. 
 While the pixel model proposed that perceived distances in touch are calculated 
by essentially counting RFs, there are also reasons for believing that additional 
processing stages are required. First, as discussed above, the fact that Weber’s illusion is 
dramatically smaller than would be predicted on the basis of cortical magnification 
alone suggests that some process of correction for differences in magnification occurs, a 
form of tactile size constancy. Second, the various top-down effects on tactile distance 
perception by illusions of body size, also discussed above, indicate that touch is 
referenced to a stored model of the represented metric properties of the body. Indeed, 
this body referencing may be how tactile size constancy is implemented. One possibility 
is that distances are calculated from a pixel map not in early somatosensory cortex but 
at higher stages of posterior parietal cortex. Tactile size constancy could be achieved by 
these higher-order maps having more proportional representation of different skin 
surfaces than more primary maps, while top-down effects of body illusions might 
produce plasticity in these higher-order maps without directly affecting low-level 
sensory maps in SI. 
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Distortions in position sense 
 Position sense is our ability to perceive the spatial locations of parts of our body, 
even in the absence of vision. This ability relies on several types of afferent signals, 
including receptors in joints signaling flexion or extension, receptors in muscle spindles 
specifying contraction or lengthening, and receptors in skin specifying stretch, along 
with efferent copies of motor commands (Proske & Gandevia, 2012). Critically, 
however, all of these afferent signals provide information about the angles of joints in 
terms of their relative flexion or extension, rather than their absolute location. Afferent 
proprioceptive signals are thus fundamentally different from global positioning system 
(GPS) signals, such as found in smartphones, which provide information about exact 
location. As a matter of simple trigonometry, information about the angles of joints is 
insufficient to determine their absolute spatial location. This information must be 
combined with information about the length of body segments between joints, 
information which isn’t specified by any immediate afferent signal and must thus come 
from a stored representation of body size and shape (Longo, Azañón, & Haggard, 2010). 
Figure 2 shows the geometry of this situation for the case of perceiving hand location. 
To tell where the wrist is in relation to the shoulder, afferent information specifying the 
angles of the shoulder and elbow joints (Θshoulder and Θelbow) must be integrated with 
stored information specifying the lengths of the upperarm and forearm (Lengthupperarm 
and Lengthforearm). 
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Figure 2: The need for a body model for position sense. To perceive the absolute location of the 
wrist relative to the shoulder, afferent signals specifying the joint angles of the shoulder (Θshoulder) 
and of the elbow (Θelbow) need to be integrated with information about the length of the segments 
connecting these joints, that is the forearm (Lengthforearm) and the upper arm (Lengthupperarm). 
Critically, however, such information about lengths is not specified by any immediate afferent 
signal, and so must come from a stored representation of body size and shape. 
 
 The general need for afferent proprioceptive information has been described by 
a number of authors over the past couple decades (e.g., Craske, Kenny, & Keith, 1984; 
Gurfinkel & Levick, 1991; Longo et al., 2010; Soechting, 1982; van Beers, Sittig, & 
Dernier van der Gon, 1998). It has generally been assumed, however, that accurate 
information about body size is readily available to the somatosensory system. Given the 
ubiquity of our body in our perceptual experience, this seems like a reasonable and 
unremarkable assumption to make. In contrast to this assumption, however, Gurfinkel 
and Levick (1991) reported anecdotal evidence that when participants were asked to 
localize two different parts of their arm, the judged locations of these parts were closer 
together than their actual locations. This result suggested that position might rely on a 
distorted representation of arm length. 
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 Longo and Haggard (2010) developed a method for isolating and measuring this 
representation of body size and shape underlying position sense of the hand. 
Traditionally, studies of position sense have asked participants to judge the location of a 
single part of the body and measured the so-called “error of localization”, the spatial 
deviation between the actual and judged locations of the body part. In contrast to this 
approach, Longo and Haggard (2010) asked participants to judge the location of 
multiple landmarks on the hand and analyzed the internal configuration of responses 
with respect to each other, ignoring the error of localization entirely. The advantage of 
this approach is that whereas constant errors of localization might arise either due to 
misperception of body part size or body posture, the internal configuration more 
directly isolates representation of body size and shape, removing biases associated with 
misperception of posture.  
 
Figure 3: The ‘psychomorphometric’ paradigm of Longo and Haggard (2010). Participants rest 
their hand on a table (left panel). Their hand is then occluded and they use a long baton to judge 
the perceived location of the tip and knuckle of each finger (right panel). By comparing the 
relative positions of judgments, an implicit perceptual map of hand structure can be constructed 
and compared with actual hand size and shape. 
 
 The paradigm of Longo and Haggard (2010) is shown in Figure 3. Participants 
laid their hand palm-down on a table underneath an occluding board. They were then 
asked to localize the tip and knuckle of each finger by positioning the tip of a baton on 
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the occluding board directly above each landmark. By comparing the relative position of 
the judgments of each landmark, Longo and Haggard (2010) constructed perceptual 
maps of represented hand size and shape, which they then compared to participants’ 
actual hands. Figure 4 shows the resulting hand maps. Maps from each participant were 
placed into best-fitting alignment using Generalized Procrustes Analysis (e.g., Bookstein, 
1991), which removes differences in location, scale, and rotation, isolating information 
about shape. The green dots indicate average location judgments for each landmark of 
18 participants after Procrustes alignment, with the green outline showing the grand-
average shape across participants. The red dots indicate actual hand shape for these 
participants, also placed into Procrustes alignment with the perceptual maps, with the 
red outline indicating the grand-average shape of participants’ actual hands. 
  
Figure 4: Results from Longo and Haggard’s (2010) study. Implicit perceptual hand maps from 
18 participants (green) are shown in best-fitting Procrustes alignment with actual hand shape 
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(red). The green and red lines connect the tip and knuckle of each finger and the knuckles of 
adjacent fingers to give an overall sense of grand-average hand shape. The warped grid shows 
how a rectangular grid superimposed on actual hand shape would have to be stretched to 
transform actual hand shape to the shape of the implicit hand map. 
  
 As is clearly apparent in Figure 4, perceptual maps of hand structure were 
systematically, and massively, distorted (Longo & Haggard, 2010). Three specific 
distortions were apparent: (1) an overestimation of hand width (approximately 75-
80%), as measured by the distance between the knuckles of the index and little fingers; 
(2) overall underestimation of finger length (~30-40%), as measured by the distance 
between the knuckle and tip of each finger; and (3) a radial-ulnar gradient, with 
underestimation of finger length increasing progressively from the thumb to the little 
finger. Subsequent studies using this paradigm have replicated this basic pattern of 
results and extended them in several ways (e.g., Ferrè, Vagnoni, & Haggard, 2013; 
Longo, 2014, 2015b; Longo & Haggard, 2012a, 2012b; Longo, Long, & Haggard, 2012; 
Longo, Mancini, & Haggard, 2015b; Mattioni & Longo, 2014; Saulton, Dodds, Bülthoff, & 
de la Rosa, 2015). For example, Longo and Haggard (2012a) found that these distortions 
were smaller in magnitude when participants judged locations on the palmar surface of 
the hand. Other studies showed that similar distortions are apparent when participants 
localize a touch using the same apparatus, showing that the effects are not an artifact of 
the use of verbal labels given to landmarks (Longo et al., 2015b; Mattioni & Longo, 
2014). 
 What underlies these distortions? Intriguingly, there appear to be similarities 
between the distortions apparent in hand maps, and known distortions of primary 
somatosensory maps in the cortex. For example, the overestimation of hand width 
relative to length mirrors the effects described in the previous section regarding tactile 
distance perception and RF geometry. In all three cases, there is a clear anisotropy on 
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the back of the hand, with a reduced anisotropy on the palmar side of the hand. 
Similarly, the radial-gradient in underestimation across the hand mirrors gradients in 
both tactile sensitivity (Duncan & Boynton, 2007; Vega-Bermudez & Johnson, 2001) and 
cortical magnification (Duncan & Boynton), which are both highest on the thumb and 
decrease progressively across the hand. Thus, Longo and Haggard (2010) suggested 
that the representation of the body’s metric properties underlying position sense, what 
they termed the body model, might preserve distortions characteristic of somatotopic 
maps in somatosensory cortex, though in attenuated form. 
 
Distortions in higher-level body representations 
 Longo and Haggard (2010) distinguished the distorted body model they 
described from the conscious body image on the basis of the different amounts of 
distortion observed across tasks. They measured the body image by adapting Gandevia 
and Phegan’s (1999) template matching task. They showed participants an array of 
hand images that had been stretched in various ways, asking them to select the hand 
image most similar in shape to what it felt like the shape of their own hand image was. 
In contrast to the large distortions observed in the hand localization task, participants’ 
selections in the template matching task were quite accurate. Subsequent studies using 
similar tasks have also found quite accurate judgments of hand shape (Longo, 2015c; 
Longo & Haggard, 2012b). Given that the distortions apparent in the localization task 
appeared to be selective for position sense, without influencing explicit judgments of 
hand shape, Longo and Haggard (2010) argued that the body model underlying position 
sense was distinct from the conscious body image. 
 Subsequent studies, however, have revealed distortions analogous to those 
found in the hand mapping task in different types of body image tasks. Longo and 
Distortions of Body Representations 
 17 
Haggard (2012b) used a ‘line length’ task to measure perceived hand size in which 
participants were shown lines of different lengths on a monitor and asked to judge 
whether each line was longer or shorter than some part of their hand, such as one of 
their fingers or the width of the hand. In contrast to the accurate judgments in the 
template matching task, in the line length task there was clear underestimation of finger 
length, which increased from the thumb to the little finger (Longo & Haggard, 2012b). 
This pattern is remarkably similar to that found in the hand localization task, though 
smaller in magnitude. This effect, thus, calls into question the sharp distinction between 
the body model and body image made by Longo and Haggard (2010). 
 A series of studies by Sally Linkenauger and her colleagues has, similarly, 
demonstrated distortions in explicit judgments of body size and shape. For example, 
Linkenauger and colleagues (2009) asked participants to adjust the length of a tape 
measure to match the perceived length of their arms, finding a lateral asymmetry such 
that right-handed people judged their right arm as longer than their left. They suggested 
that this effect might reflect differences in the representation of the dominant and non-
dominant limbs in sensorimotor cortex. Linkenauger and colleagues (2015) asked 
participants to make judgments about the length of different parts of the body in terms 
of some other body part (e.g., “How many hand lengths would it take to match your 
height?”). Large misestimations were apparent in such judgments, but were not seen 
when participants performed the same task using a non-body object as a metric (e.g., 
“How many of these sticks would it take to match your height?”).  
 Christina Fuentes and her colleagues (Fuentes, Longo, & Haggard, 2013; Fuentes, 
Pazzaglia, et al., 2013; Fuentes, Runa, et al., 2013) took a different approach to 
measuring explicit representations of body structure. They adapted a task originally 
developed for use with neurological patients (Daurat-Hmeljiak, Stambak, & Berges, 
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1978), in which participants are shown an image of a head meant to represent their 
own hand and asked to judge where other parts of their body would be. Whereas the 
original study had focused on gross, qualitative mislocalizations as a measure of 
disruption of the body image following brain damage, Fuentes and colleagues (Fuentes, 
Longo, & Haggard, 2013) investigated the precise metric relationship between judged 
locations using methods similar to those used by Longo and Haggard (2010) to 
investigate perceptual hand maps in position sense. Both in the case of the body as a 
whole (Fuentes, Longo, & Haggard, 2013) and the face specifically (Fuentes, Runa, et al., 
2013), these maps showed large overestimation of body width compared to height. 
Finally, two recent studies have suggested the people may also show distortions 
even for conceptual understanding of the locations of different body parts. Longo 
(2015d) asked participants to indicate the location of their knuckles (i.e., the 
metacarpophalangeal joint) by placing the tip of a baton on their palm at the location 
directly opposite the location of the knuckle. Remarkably, participants showed a distal 
bias, judging their knuckles as too far forward in the hand, for all fingers except the 
thumbs. This effect was also clearly apparent when participants responded while 
blindfolded, relying only on tactile cues, suggesting that it does not reflect an effect of 
visual capture by, for example, the crease at the base of the fingers on the palmar hand 
surface. Moreover, the same effect was found when participants judged the locations of 
the experimenter’s knuckles, suggesting that it does not reflect something about 
people’s representations of their own hands specifically, but rather something about 
their conceptual understanding of hands in general. Margolis and Longo (2015) found a 
similar distal bias when participants were asked to locate their knuckles on a silhouette 
image of their hand. 
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How are different distortions related? 
 I have described several types of distortion of body representations in healthy 
adults. This naturally begs the question of what the relation is between these different 
distortions. I will describe three types of proposal that have been recently made about 
the potential relations between distorted body representations. Longo and colleagues 
(2010) argued that both tactile distance perception and position sense required that 
immediate afferent signals be referenced to a stored representation of body size and 
shape, suggesting that both abilities might rely on a single representation they called 
the ‘body model’. The findings that similar distortions (e.g., overestimation of hand 
width vs. length, larger on the dorsal than the palmar hand surface) are found for both 
tactile distance perception (Longo & Haggard, 2011; Longo et al., in press) and position 
sense (Longo & Haggard, 2010, 2012a) is consistent with this proposal for a common 
body model underlying both. Nevertheless, the overall emphasis of the model of 
somatoperceptual information processing proposed by Longo and colleagues (2010) 
was on categorical distinctions between different types of body representation. For 
example, the body model was presented as completely distinct from other body 
representations such as the ‘postural schema’, related to real-time tracking of limb 
posture, and the ‘superficial schema’ involved in tactile localization on the skin surface. 
For example, Mancini and colleagues (Mancini, Longo, Iannetti, & Haggard, 2011) found 
large and stereotyped biases in tactile localization on the skin, which had no apparent 
relation to those found for tactile distance perception or position sense. Similarly, Longo 
and Haggard (2010) argued that the body model was distinct from the conscious body 
image based on the presence of distortions for the former but not the latter. Thus, 
where qualitatively distinct patterns of distortion are found, different representations 
may be involved. 
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 As described above, however, subsequent research has found that some types of 
body image task do appear to show distortions analogous to those found in position 
sense (Longo & Haggard, 2012b). This result challenges the proposal that the body 
model and body image are entirely separate representations, suggesting instead that 
they may be affected by common influences, though perhaps to different degrees. 
Further, there are clear bi-directional influences between high-level visual 
representations of the body and low-level somatosensory representations. For example, 
altering somatosensory afferent signals through anesthesia alters the conscious body 
image (Gandevia & Phegan, 1999; Türker, Yeo, & Gandevia, 2005), while vision of the 
body modulates low-level aspects of somatosensory (e.g., Kennett et al., 2001; Longo, 
Pernigo, & Haggard, 2011) and even autonomic (e.g., Sadibolova & Longo, 2014) 
processing. Longo (2015a) proposed a hierarchical model of body representations, 
which suggests that implicit body representations (such as the body model) and explicit 
ones (such as the body image) lie at opposite ends of a continuum. This continuum can 
be thought of in terms of the spatial scale at which the body is represented. At one 
extreme of the continuum like primary somatotopic maps of the body surface, such as 
those in SI; at the other extreme is our conscious experience of our body as a coherent 
volumetric object in the world. On this interpretation, body representations along the 
continuum will be characterized by different weightings of (distorted) somatosensory 
representations and (largely veridical) visual representation. This can, thus, account for 
the finding of qualitatively similar distortions for the body model and body image (e.g., 
Longo & Haggard, 2012b), which nevertheless differ in magnitude. 
 A third possibility was recently proposed by Linkenauger et al. (2015). On their 
interpretation, visual representations of the body show distortions directly opposite to 
those of somatosensory representations. By showing such inverse distortion, the 
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combination of visual and somatosensory could be used to correct for the distortions 
that result in Weber’s illusion. As discussed above, the magnitude of Weber’s illusion is 
dramatically smaller than would be predicted based on differences in cortical 
magnification across skin surfaces alone. Inverse distortion could thus account for the 
process of tactile size constancy producing this reduction. At present, the exact relations 
between different body representations and their distortions remains unclear. I have 
described three potential models of these relations. Understanding this issue is an 
important goal for future research.  
 
Conclusions 
 This paper has discussed research demonstrating that distorted body 
representations are not limited to disease, but a ubiquitous part of healthy human 
cognition. In ordinary English, to know something “like the back of one’s hand” is to 
emphasize the intimacy and accuracy of one’s knowledge. The results I have described 
show that we don’t know the back of our hand like the back of our hand. Understanding 
the causes and implications of such distorted body representations is an important goal 
for future research. 
 Our experience and mental representation of our body goes right to the core of 
some of the most central issues in experimental psychology, including  our sense of self 
and our personal identity as an individual. William James (1890) noted that our body is 
not really ours, but is us. Recent work in philosophy and neuroscience has emphasized 
the importance of the body as the core of ‘minimal phenomenal selfhood’ (Blanke & 
Metzinger, 2009). The putative role of the body as the bedrock of our sense of 
individuality and selfhood makes the distortions I have described seem both more 
profoundly strange and puzzling. Recent research using paradigms like the rubber hand 
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illusion (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Longo et al., 2008) and full-body illusions (e.g., 
Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007; Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & 
Sanchez-Vives, 2009) has revealed that abnormal bodily experiences can profoundly 
influence our sense of self. An important goal for future research is to understand how 
our ordinary experience of our body – distortions and all – shapes selfhood and 
personal identity. 
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